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Microeconomics-Testbank1(Hubbard/O'BrienChapter17TheEconomicsofInformation1Whenonepartytoaneconomictransactionhaslessinformationthantheotherpartyitisknownas:Amoralhazard.Beconomicirrationality.Casymmetricinformation.Dadverseselection.2Whenpeoplewhobuyinsurancechangetheirbehaviorbecausetheyareprotectedfromlossbytheinsurance,theinsurancemarketexhibits:Amoralhazard.Badverseselection.Casymmetricinformation.Deconomicirrationality.3Whenaninsurancecompanyattractsbuyerswhoknowtheyaremorelikelymakeaclaimonthepolicythantheinsurancecompanyknows,theinsurancecompanyissuffering:Amoralhazard.Badverseselection.Casymmetricinformation.Deconomicirrationality.4Thepartywiththemostinformationaboutfirmssellingstocksandbondsis:Astockandbondbrokerswhoearnalivingbyrecommendingfinancialassets.Bthefirmsellingthestocksandbonds.Capersonwhomaybuythestocksandbonds.Deverypartyinthefinancialmarkethasaccesstothesamelevelofinformation.5Buyersandsellershavecompleteknowledgeabouttheproductbeingboughtandsoldin:Athemarketfortherighttodrillforoilongovernmentland.Bthetelecommunicationsmarket.Cthemarketforusedautomobiles.Dnoneoftheabove.6Inausedcarmarketwherehalfthecarsaregoodandhalfarelemons,rationalbuyerswillmakebidshalf-waybetweenwhattheywouldpayforagoodcarandalemoncarandsellerswillagreetosellmostlythelemonsatthatpriceresultingdueto:Amoralhazard.Badverseselection.Canefficientmarket.Deconomicirrationality.7Inamarketsituationwithasymmetricinformation,theparticipantwiththemostknowledgeisabletoagreetoatransactionthatbenefitsthemandcausesthesellertonotbenefitdueto:Amoralhazard.Badverseselection.Ceconomicallyirrationalbehavior.
Dgainsfromtrade.8Adverseselectioncanbereducedintheusedcarmarketby:Ausedcardealersofferingawarrantyonthecarssold.Bgovernmentregulationofthepriceforusedcars.Cbuyersrevealinghowmuchtheywantcars.Dalloftheabove.9Adverseselectioncanbereducedintheusedcarmarketby:Ausedcardealersbuildingareputationforsellingreliableusedcars.Bgovernmentregulationofthepriceforusedcars.Cbuyersrevealinghowmuchtheywantcars.Dalloftheabove.10Theproblemofadverseselectioncanbereducedinthehealthinsurancemarketby:Ainsurancecompaniescollectingasmuchinformationastheycanaboutpeopleapplyingforinsurance.Binsurancecompaniescarryingouttheirownmedicalexaminationsofpeopleapplyingforinsurance.Cinsurancecompaniesrequiringpotentialcustomerstosubmittheirmedicalhistories.Dalloftheabove.11Ifastaterequiresalldriverstobuyautoinsurance,insurancecompaniesavoid:Aasymmetricinformation.Bmoralhazard.Cadverseselection.Dsunkcosts.12Thecostofgrouphealthinsuranceislowerthanifanindividualbuysapolicyontheirownbecause:Atheproblemofadverseselectiononthepartofbuyersisreduced.Bmoralhazardcostsofagrouptendtomovetoalowaverage.Citiseasierforthecompanytodenyclaimsfromalargegroup.Dinsuringagroupeliminatestheproblemofbuyershavingmoreinformationthanthesellerofinsurance.13Individualsbuyapolicythatpromisestopaythemacertainamountofmoneypertimeperiodaslongastheyarealiveto:Aprotectthemselvesfromrunningoutofmoneybeforetheydie.Bbeabletoquitworkingbeforeretirementage.Cavoidtaxes.Davoidsunkcosts.14SocialSecurityintheU.S.islike:Ainsurancepremiums.Basymmetricinformation.Canannuity.Dmoralhazard.15IfworkersareallowedtodivertsomeoftheirSocialSecuritytaxesintopurchasingannuities,
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